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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kcee A. Lacefield challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. He
argues the district court erred by denying his motion because he was subject to a warrantless
seizure, without reasonable suspicion, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A police officer stopped Mr. Lacefield as he was leaving a residence with a woman, and a
second officer eventually searched Mr. Lacefield's backpack. (See R., pp.49-52.) The second
officer found methamphetamine and paraphernalia inside. (R., p.52.) Consequently, the State
filed a criminal complaint alleging Mr. Lacefield committed the crimes of possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.8-9.) After a preliminary
hearing, the magistrate bound him over to district court. (R., pp.26-27.) The State charged
Mr. Lacefield by Information with these two drug offenses. (R., pp.29-30.)
Mr. Lacefield moved to suppress the evidence found in the backpack. (R., pp.33-37.) He
argued (1) the first officer seized him and (2) the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for
the seizure. (R., pp.35-36.) The State did not respond.
The district court held a hearing on the motion. The two police officers testified. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.4, L. l -p.25, L.17.) After their testimony, Mr. Lacefield argued the first officer seized him
upon telling him to stop while walking with the woman. (Tr. Vol. I, p.25, L.20-p.27, L.3, p.29,
L.24-p.30, L.12.) The State argued Mr. Lacefield was not seized during the officers'
investigation. (Tr. Vol. I, p.27, L.7-p.29, L.20.)
The district court ruled on the motion at the end of the hearing and later issued a written
decision. In its written decision, the district court listed its factual findings:
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1. On June 18, 2018, at about 4:20 p.m., Detectives Aaron Nay and Josh Hayes
were observing a residence located near Ketchum St. E. and 2nd Ave. E. in
Twin Falls, Idaho. Detectives believed Ariel Stark, who had an outstanding
felony warrant for her arrest, was at the residence.
2. While observing the residence, the detectives noticed one male and one
female leave the residence together.
3. Nay testified that he believed the female was Ariel Stark based upon the
female's stature, hair, and manner of dress. Nay approached the individuals
from behind, activated his vehicle's overhead lights, and requested that the
female stop. Nay did not specify at the time that he said "stop" that he was
only referring to the female and not to Defendant.
4. After the female and Defendant stopped walking, Nay approached the female
and began conversing with her in order to confirm her [identity]. Initially, Nay
had no interaction with Defendant.
5. Nay eventually discovered that the woman was not Ariel Stark, but was
actually Ashely [sic] Allen, who also had outstanding warrants for her arrest.
During his questioning of Ms. Allen, Nay separated Ms. Allen from the
Defendant and had her sit on the curb. After Nay confirmed the warrants for
Ms. Allen, he placed Ms. Allen under arrest.
6. At some point, about two minutes into his questioning of Ms. Allen, Nay
asked Defendant if he had any identification on his person or if he had any
outstanding warrants. Defendant answered in the negative to both questions.
7. During the time that Nay spoke with, and ultimately arrested, Ashley Allen,
Defendant did not leave the general area. Instead, Defendant freely walked
around the area, kneeled down, made several phone calls, sent text messages,
and did not engage in any way in Nay's conversation and questioning of
Allen. Nor did Nay engage Defendant in any way other than the two questions
cited above.
8. Several minutes later, Detective Hayes arrived on-scene. Hayes parked his
vehicle in the general vicinity; however, Hayes did not activate the lights on
his vehicle. Hayes approached the area where Nay was questioning Ms. Allen.
He was not running, did not have a weapon drawn, and did not engage either
Defendant or Ms. Allen. Hayes noted that Defendant was frantically making
phone calls and was acting nervous.
9. Eventually, Hayes approached Defendant and asked Defendant a number of
questions including: Defendant's name, date of birth, whether he was on
probation, ifhe had been in trouble before, and how he knew Ms. Allen.
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10. Detective Hayes continued to question Defendant, who appeared increasingly
nervous and took longer than expected to answer. Hayes did not place
Defendant under arrest, did not tell Defendant to sit down on the curb as
Ms. Allen had been instructed to do, nor did Hayes tell Defendant that he
could not leave the scene.
11. Defendant was wearing a black backpack.
12. During Hayes conversation with Defendant, a grey Dodge Avenger with State
of Ohio license plates appeared at the scene. Detective Hayes recognized the
vehicle as one he earlier observed leaving a residence known for drug activity.
13. Detective Hayes left Defendant and walked to the Dodge Avenger to speak
with the driver, asking why she came to a stop near the scene. The driver
explained that she was Defendant's girlfriend and had come to pick up
Defendant. Hayes asked the driver if Defendant had any issues with drugs.
The driver explained that Defendant had been arrested about a month ago for
possession of methamphetamine.
14. Hayes returned to the Defendant, who still had not left the area, asked
permission to search Defendant's backpack. Defendant claimed that the
backpack did not belong to him, but to a friend. Hayes inquired whether there
was something in the backpack that gave Defendant concern. Defendant
replied that there might be some "white" (referring to methamphetamine) in
the backpack because his "friend" uses drugs.
15. Defendant then voluntarily gave the backpack to Detective Hayes.
16. Detective Hayes' search of the backpack led to the discovery of controlled
substances and drug paraphernalia.
17. Hayes advised Defendant of his Miranda Rights.
18. Afterward, Defendant admitted that he knew there was methamphetamine in
the backpack because he had previously looked inside and noticed it there.
19. Hayes placed Defendant under arrest for possession of methamphetamine.
(R., pp.49-52.) In light of these factual findings, the district court ruled:
Here, Detective Nay did activate his emergency lights and said "stop" in
order to stop Ms. Allen. Both Ms. Allen and Defendant were walking together and
Nay did not initially specify which of the two individuals he was commanding to
stop. However, while Nay did not tell Defendant he was free to go or that this
command of "stop" did not apply to him, Nay also did not initially engage
Defendant during the encounter. When Nay eventually engaged Defendant, he
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simply asked if Defendant had any identification on him or had any outstanding
warrants. When Defendant answered in the negative, Nay simply ignored
Defendant.
During the entire encounter between law enforcement and Ms. Allen,
Defendant had complete freedom of movement and communication. Defendant
walked around the area making phone calls. Defendant's exit from the area was
not blocked in any manner. Although the subjective belief of a defendant is not
relevant to a seizure analysis, a reasonable person who had the freedom to act as
Defendant did in this instance would have believed he was free to leave.
Therefore, it is the fact that Detective Nay exercised no control over Defendant's
behavior, in contrast with Nay's orders to Allen to sit down and remain on the
sidewalk curb while he conducted his investigation, that inform the Court's
analysis of whether a seizure of Defendant occurred. The Court finds that
Defendant was not seized under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but
voluntarily remained on the scene with Allen.
(R., p.54.) The district court also determined Mr. Lacefield's encounter with the officers was
consensual, Mr. Lacefield consented to the search of the backpack, and Mr. Lacefield's
admission after Miranda 1 warnings was voluntary. 2 (R., pp.55-56.)

1
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The district court's oral ruling was similar to its written decision:
I'll first -- I'll preface my remarks with the acknowledgment that the
standard here is what a reasonable person would believe, whether or not they were
free to leave, and, in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion, whether or
not there was an improper seizure.
And in this case, I will note that the initial detective, when he arrived, he
did engage his lights, although he was behind the defendant. He did not pull in
front of them. He did not prevent them from leaving with his vehicle.
He did tell the defendants to stop. He did have reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop Ms. Ashley under the basis that he thought it was Ms. Stark.
When both of the individuals stopped, the detective focused his investigation as to
Ms. Allen and not to -- not to the defendant. He did not tell the defendant he was
free to leave, but he also did not tell him that he could not go.
I will note that the detective did not engage the defendant at that time. The
defendant, for up to two minutes, did not, other than asking him if he had ID, to
which the defendant respond that he did not have ID, and the detective did not
follow up on that issue, did not pursue that, and did not at that time tell the
defendant that he was not free to leave because he did not have ID.
I will also note that when Detective Hayes arrived, his questioning of the
defendant was not in such a manner that it would indicate that the defendant could
4

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Lacefield entered a conditional guilty
plea to possession of a controlled substance. (Tr. Vol. II, p.12, L.17-p.13, L.22; R., pp.59, 70.)
Mr. Lacefield reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.1-8; R., pp.71-72.) The State agreed to dismiss the other charge. (R., pp.70,
81, 82.) The district court sentenced Mr. Lacefield to six years, with three years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, L.22-p.18, L.3.)
Mr. Lacefield timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.73-78, 85-88.)

not leave. Detective Hayes -- well, in fact, I don't believe any of the detectives
had guns out.
They allowed the defendant to stand by. He was standing at least four feet
from Ms. Ashley. He was walking around. He was moving around. He was
kneeling down. He was making phone calls.
Whereas, with respect to Ms. Allen, it was clear that, to me, from the
testimony and the evidence presented in this case, that she was the focus of the
investigation, not Mr. Lacefield. She was told to sit on the curb. She was placed in
the police car rather than -- rather than Mr. Lacefield.
And so based upon the evidence that was presented to the Court, I do find that a
reasonable person would have believed he was free to go. A person who feels that
they are kept there by police would not be making phone calls, would not be
moving around, and would feel obligated to stay in one spot. And clearly,
Mr. Lacefield did not do those things. And to me, a reasonable person would not
feel that he had been seized and could not leave.
And so on this particular basis, I fmd that there was no improper seizure
that's in violation of the Fourth Amendment
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 30, L.17-p.32, L.16.) After this ruling, the district court inquired if Mr. Lacefield
had a separate basis to suppress the contraband found in the backpack. (Tr. Vol. I, p.32, Ls.1719.) Mr. Lacefield clarified his only basis for suppression was the illegal seizure. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.32, Ls.22-23.)
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Lacefield's motion to suppress evidence obtained from
his warrantless seizure?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Lacefield's Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained
From His Warrantless Seizure
A.

Introduction
Mr. Lacefield argues the district court erred by denying his suppression motion because

Detective Nay seized him without a warrant or reasonable suspicion. This seizure violated
Mr. Lacefield's Fourth Amendment rights, and all evidence obtained from the unlawful seizure,
including the contraband in the backpack, must be suppressed as the fruit of the illegality.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court "defer[ s] to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous.

However, free review is exercised over a trial court's determination as to whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658
(2007) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Lacefield's Motion To Suppress Because
Detective Nay Unlawfully Seized Him And Obtained Evidence From That Illegal Seizure
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). A warrantless
seizure is presumptively unreasonable, unless the State shows the seizure fits within a wellestablished exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886-87 (2015);

see also Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002) ("When a warrantless search or seizure is
challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to
the warrant requirement is applicable."); State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014)
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(same). The defense, however, has the burden to prove a seizure occurred. State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 843 (2004).
"The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is an
objective one, evaluating whether under the totality of the circumstances 'a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' Henage,
143 Idaho at 658 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)). "A seizure does not
occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the street or other public place
and asks a few questions." State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Bostick, 501
U.S. 429; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)). "So long as police do not convey a
message that compliance with their requests is required, the encounter is deemed 'consensual'
and no reasonable suspicion is required." Id.
On the other hand, a seizure occurs "when an officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen." State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 167 (Ct. App.
2011).
Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where the person did
not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled.
Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). In addition,

"whether the officer used overhead emergency lights and whether the officer took action to block
a vehicle's exit route" "may indicate a seizure." Id. "The critical question is whether, taking into
account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have
communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not at liberty to ignore the police

8

presence and go about his or her business." State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App.
2000) (citing State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479 (Ct. App. 1999)).
Here, Mr. Lacefield argues a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the
encounter with Detectives Nay and Hayes. Detective Nay drove up behind Mr. Lacefield and
Ms. Allen and activated his overhead lights. (R., p.49.) He got out of his patrol car and ordered
them to stop walking and "come over here." (R., pp.49-50; Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.16-17, p.11,
Ls.3-5.) He did not direct his command at Ms. Allen only. (R., pp.49-50.) They both complied.
(R., p.50.) About two minutes into the seizure, Detective Nay asked Mr. Lacefield for
identification and his warrant status. (R., p.50.) Detective Hayes arrived on scene a few minutes
later and also asked Mr. Lacefield some questions. (R., p.51.) He asked for Mr. Lacefield's
name, his "date of birth, whether he was on probation, if he had been in trouble before, and how
he knew Ms. Allen." (R., p.51.) Neither officer told Mr. Lacefield he was free to leave.
(R.,pp.50-51; Tr. Vol. I, p.8, Ls.8-16, p.16, L.25-p.17, L.2, p.17, Ls.19-21.) And neither
officer completely ignored Mr. Lacefield. Rather, both officers separately questioned him during
the encounter. In light of these circumstances, Mr. Lacefield asserts he was subject to a
warrantless seizure, without reasonable suspicion, upon Detective Nay ordering him to stop. This
illegal seizure violated Mr. Lacefield's Fourth Amendment rights.
Due to this Fourth Amendment violation, the district court should have granted
Mr. Lacefield's motion to suppress. The evidence obtained, such as the contraband in the
backpack, would not have been found but for the illegal seizure. The detectives only gained
access to the backpack because Mr. Lacefield was wearing it when the detectives seized him.
The evidence was "come by at exploitation of that illegality." Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional police conduct subject to
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exclusion); see also State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2008) (same). Therefore, the district
court erred by denying Mr. Lacefield's motion to suppress the evidence following his illegal
seizure.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lacefield respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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